Progress on the question of whether policymakers should respond directly to …nancial variables requires a realistic economic model that captures the links between asset prices, credit expansion, and real economic activity. Standard DSGE models with fully-rational expectations have di¢ culty producing large swings in house prices and household debt that resemble the patterns observed in many industrial countries over the past decade. We show that the introduction of simple moving-average forecast rules for a subset of households can signi…cantly magnify the volatility and persistence of house prices and household debt relative to otherwise similar model with fully-rational expectations. We evaluate various policy actions that might be used to dampen the resulting excess volatility, including a direct response to house price growth or credit growth in the central bank's interest rate rule, the imposition of a more restrictive loan-to-value ratio, and the use of a modi…ed collateral constraint that takes into account the borrower's wage income. Of these, we …nd that a loan-to-income type constraint is the most e¤ective tool for dampening overall excess volatility in the model economy. We …nd that while an interest-rate response to house price growth or credit growth can stabilize some economic variables, it can signi…cantly magnify the volatility of others, particularly in ‡ation.
Introduction
Household leverage in many industrial countries increased dramatically in the years prior to 2007. Countries with the largest increases in household debt relative to income tended to experience the fastest run-ups in house prices over the same period. The same countries tended to experience the most severe declines in consumption once house prices started falling (Glick and Lansing 2010, International Monetary Fund 2012) . 1 Within the United States, house prices during the boom years of the mid-2000s rose faster in areas where subprime and exotic mortgages were more prevalent Su… 2009, Pavlov and Wachter 2011) . In a given area, past house price appreciation had a signi…cant positive in ‡uence on subsequent loan approval rates (Goetzmann, et al. 2012) . U.S. counties which experienced the largest run-ups in household leverage tended to experience the most severe recessions as measured by the subsequent fall in durables consumption or the subsequent rise in the unemployment rate (Mian and Su… 2010) . Overall, the data suggests the presence of a self-reinforcing feedback loop in which an in ‡ux of new homebuyers with access to easy mortgage credit helped fuel an excessive run-up in house prices. The run-up, in turn, encouraged lenders to ease credit further on the assumption that house prices would continue to rise. Recession severity in a given area appears to re ‡ect the degree to which prior growth in that area was driven by an unsustainable borrowing trend-one which came to an abrupt halt once house prices stopped rising (Mian and Su… 2012) . Figure 1 illustrates the simultaneous boom in U.S. real house prices and per capita real household debt that occurred during the mid-2000s. During the boom years, per capita real GDP remained consistently above trend. At the time, many economists and policymakers argued that the strength of the U.S. economy was a fundamental factor supporting house prices. However, it is now clear that much of the strength of the economy during this time was linked to the housing boom itself. Consumers extracted equity from appreciating home values to pay for all kinds of goods and services while hundreds of thousands of jobs were created in residential construction, mortgage banking, and real estate. After peaking in 2006, real house prices have retraced to the downside while the level of real household debt has started to decline. Real GDP experienced a sharp drop during the Great Recession and remains about 5% below trend. Other macroeconomic variables also su¤ered severe declines, including per capita real consumption and the employment-to-population ratio. 2 The unwinding of excess household leverage via higher saving or increased defaults is 1 King (1994) identi…ed a similar correlation between prior increases in household leverage and the severity of the early 1990s recession using data for ten major industrial countries from 1984 to 1992. He also notes that U.S. consumer debt more than doubled during the 1920s-a factor that likely contributed to the severity of the Great Depression in the early 1930s.
2 For details, see Lansing (2011) .
imposing a signi…cant drag on consumer spending and bank lending in many countries, thus hindering the vigor of the global economic recovery. 3 In the aftermath of the global …nancial crisis and the Great Recession, it is important to consider what lessons might be learned for the conduct of policy. Historical episodes of sustained rapid credit expansion together with booming stock or house prices have often signaled threats to …nancial and economic stability (Borio and Lowe 2002) . Times of prosperity which are fueled by easy credit and rising debt are typically followed by lengthy periods of deleveraging and subdued growth in GDP and employment (Reinhart and Reinhart 2010) . According to Borio and Lowe (2002) "If the economy is indeed robust and the boom is sustainable, actions by the authorities to restrain the boom are unlikely to derail it altogether. By contrast, failure to act could have much more damaging consequences, as the imbalances unravel." This raises the question of what "actions by the authorities" could be used to restrain the boom? Our goal in this paper is to explore the e¤ects of various policy measures that might be used to lean against credit-fueled imbalances.
Standard DSGE models with fully-rational expectations have di¢ culty producing large swings in house prices and household debt that resemble the patterns observed in many industrial countries over the past decade. Indeed, it is common for such models to include highly persistent exogenous shocks to rational agents'preferences for housing in an e¤ort to bridge the gap between the model and the data. 4 If housing booms and busts were truly driven by preference shocks, then central banks would seem to have little reason to be concerned about them. Declines in the collateral value of an asset are often modeled as being driven by exogenous fundamental shocks to the "quality" of the asset, rather than the result of a burst asset price bubble. 5 Taken literally, this setup would imply that the decline in U.S. house prices since 2007 was caused by something akin to a nationwide infestation of wood termites. Kocherlakota (2009) We use the term "excess volatility"to describe a situation where macroeconomic variables 3 See, for example, Roxburgh, et al. (2012) . 4 Examples include Iacoviello (2005) , Iacoviello and Neri (2010) , and Walentin and Sellin (2010) . 5 See, for example, Gertler et al. (2012) in which a …nancial crisis is triggered by an exogenous "disaster shock" that wipes out a fraction of the productive capital stock. Similarly, a model-based study by the International Monetary Fund (2009) states that (p. 110) "Although asset booms can arise from expectations...without any change in fundamentals, we do not model bubbles or irrational exuberence." Gilchrist and Leahy (2002) examine the response of monetary policy to asset prices in a rational expectations model with exogenous "net worth shocks." move too much to be explained by a rational response to fundamentals. Numerous empirical studies starting with Shiller (1981) and LeRoy and Porter (1981) have shown that stock prices appear to exhibit excess volatility when compared to the discounted stream of ex post realized dividends. 6 Similarly, Campbell et al. (2009) …nd that movements in U.S. house price-rent ratios cannot be fully explained by movements in future rent growth.
We introduce excess volatility into an otherwise standard DSGE model by allowing a fraction of households to depart from fully-rational expectations. Speci…cally, we show that the introduction of simple moving-average forecast rules, i.e., adaptive expectations, for a subset of households can signi…cantly magnify the volatility and persistence of house prices and household debt. As shown originally by Muth (1960) , a moving-average forecast rule with exponentially-declining weights on past data will coincide with rational expectations when the forecast variable evolves as a random walk with permanent and temporary shocks. Such a forecast rule can be viewed as boundedly-rational because it economizes on the costs of collecting and processing information. As noted by Nerlove (1983 Nerlove ( , p. 1255 : "Purposeful economic agents have incentives to eliminate errors up to a point justi…ed by the costs of obtaining the information necessary to do so...The most readily available and least costly information about the future value of a variable is its past value." 7 The basic structure of the model is similar to Iacoviello (2005) with two types of households. Patient-lender households own the entire capital stock and operate monopolisticallycompetitive …rms. Impatient-borrower households derive income only from labor and face a borrowing constraint linked to the market value of their housing stock. Expectations are modeled as a weighted-average of a fully-rational forecast rule and a moving-average forecast rule. We calibrate the parameters of the hybrid expectations model to generate an empirically plausible degree of volatility in the simulated house price and household debt series. Our setup implies that 30% of households employ a moving-average forecast rule while the remaining 70% are fully-rational. 8 Due to the self-referential nature of the model's equilibrium conditions, the unit root assumption embedded in the moving-average forecast rule serves to magnify the volatility of endogenous variables in the model. Our setup captures the idea that much of the run-up in U.S. house prices and credit during the boom years was linked to the in ‡ux of an unsophisticated population of new homebuyers. 9 Given their inexperience, these buyers would 6 Lansing and LeRoy (2012) provide a recent update on this literature. 7 An empirical study by Chow (1989) …nds that an asset pricing model with adaptive expectations outperforms one with rational expectations in accounting for observed movements in U.S. stock prices and interest rates.
8 Using U.S. data over the period 1981 to 2006 , Levin et al. (2012 estimate that around 65 to 80 percent of agents employ moving-average forecast rules in the context of DSGE model which omits house prices and household debt.
9 See and Chapter 6 of the report of the U.S. Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (2011) , titled "Credit Expansion." be more likely to employ simple forecast rules about future house prices, income, etc. Case, et al. (2012) perform an analysis of survey data on house price expectations in four cities over the period 2003 to 2012. They …nd (p. 17) that "12-month expectations are fairly well descibed as attenuated versions of lagged actual 12-month price changes." Figure 2 shows that house price forecasts derived from the futures market for the Case-Shiller house price index (which are only available from 2006 onwards) often exhibit a series of one-sided forecast errors.
The futures market tends to overpredict future house prices when prices are falling-a pattern that is consistent with a moving-average forecast rule. Similarly, the top panel of Figure 3 shows that U.S. in ‡ation expectations derived from the Survey of Professional Forecasters tend to systematically underpredict subsequent actual in ‡ation in the sample period prior to 1979 when in ‡ation was rising and systematically overpredict it thereafter when in ‡ation was falling. Rational expectations would not give rise to such a sustained sequence of one-sided forecast errors. 10 The bottom panel of Figure 3 shows that the survey pattern is well-captured by an exponentially-weighted moving-average of past in ‡ation rates, where the weight on the most recent in ‡ation observation is 0.35. Interestingly, a weight of 0.35 on the most recent in ‡ation observation is consistent with a Kalman …lter forecast in which agents'perceived law of motion for in ‡ation is a random walk plus noise (Lansing 2009 ).
The volatilities of house prices and household debt in the hybrid expectations model are about two times larger than those in the rational expectations model. Both variables exhibit higher persistence under hybrid expectations. Stock price volatility is magni…ed by a factor of about 1.3, whereas the volatilities of output, in ‡ation, consumption, and labor hours are magni…ed by factors ranging from 1.1 to 1.9. These results are striking given that only 30% of households in the model employ moving-average forecast rules. The use of such forecast rules by even a small subset of agents can have a large in ‡uence on model dynamics because the presence of these agents also in ‡uences the nature of the fully-rational forecast rules employed by the remaining agents.
Given the presence of excess volatility, we evaluate various policy actions that might be used to dampen the observed ‡uctuations. With regard to monetary policy, we consider a direct response to either house price growth or credit growth in the central bank's interest rate rule. With regard to macroprudential policy, we consider the imposition of a more restrictive loan-to-value ratio (i.e., a tightening of lending standards) and the use of a modi…ed collateral constraint that takes into account the borrower's wage income. Of these, we …nd that a loanto-income type constraint is the most e¤ective tool for dampening overall excess volatility in 1 0 Numerous studies document evidence of bias and ine¢ ciency in survey forecasts of U.S. in ‡ation. See, for example, Roberts (1997) , Mehra (2002 ), Carroll (2003 , and Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers (2004) . More recently, Coibion and Gorodnichencko (2012) …nd robust evidence against full-information rational expectations in survey forecasts for U.S. in ‡ation and unemployment. the model economy. We …nd that while an interest-rate response to house price growth or credit growth can stabilize some economic variables, it can signi…cantly magnify the volatility of others, particularly in ‡ation.
Our results for an interest rate response to house price growth show some bene…ts under rational expectations (lower volatilities for household debt and consumption) but the bene…ts under hybrid expectations are less pronounced. Under both expectation regimes, in ‡ation volatility is magni…ed with the e¤ect being particularly severe under hybrid expectations.
Such results are unsatisfactory from the standpoint of an in ‡ation-targeting central bank that seeks to minimize a weighted-sum of squared deviations of in ‡ation and output from target values. Indeed we show that the value of a typical central bank loss function rises monotonically as more weight in placed on house price growth in the interest rate rule.
The results for an interest rate response to credit growth also show some bene…ts under rational expectations. However, these bene…ts mostly disappear under hybrid expectations.
Moreover, the undesirable magni…cation of in ‡ation volatility becomes much worse. The results for this experiment demonstrate that the e¤ects of a particular monetary policy can be in ‡uenced by the nature of agents'expectations. 11 We note that Christiano, et al. (2010) …nd that a strong interest-rate response to credit growth can improve the welfare of a representative household in a rational expectations model with news shocks. Such results could be sensitive to their assumption of fully-rational expectations.
Turning to macroprudential policy, we …nd that a reduction in the loan-to-value ratio from 0.7 to 0.5 substantially reduces the volatility of household debt under both expectations regimes, but the volatility of most other variables are slightly magni…ed by factors ranging from 1.01 to 1.08. The volatility of aggregate consumption and aggregate labor hours are little changed. For policymakers, these mixed stabilization results must be weighed against the drawbacks of permanently restricting household access to borrowed money which helps impatient households smooth their consumption. In the sensitivity analysis, we …nd that an increase in the loan-to-value ratio (implying looser lending standards) reduces the volatility of aggregate consumption and aggregate labor hours but it signi…cantly magni…es the volatility of household debt. A natural alternative to a permanent change in the loan-to-value ratio is to shift the ratio in a countercyclical manner without changing its steady-state value. A number of papers have identi…ed stabilization bene…ts from the use of countercyclical loan-to-value rules in rational expectations models. 12 Another macroprudential policy approach, examined by Bianchi and Mendoza (2010) , is to employ a pro-cyclical tax on debt which leans against 1 1 Orphanides and Williams (2009) make a related point. They …nd that an optimal control policy derived under the assumption of perfect knowledge about the structure of the economy can perform poorly when knowledge is imperfect.
1 2 See, for example, Kannan, Rabanal and Scott (2009), Angelini, Neri, and Panetta (2010) , Christensen and Meh (2011), and Lambertini, Mendicino and Punzi (2011). over-borrowing by private-sector agents.
Our …nal policy experiment achieves a countercyclical loan-to-value ratio in a novel way by requiring lenders to place a substantial weight on the borrower's wage income in the borrowing constraint. As the weight on the borrower's wage income increases, the generalized borrowing constraint takes on more of the characteristics of a loan-to-income constraint. Intuitively, a loan-to-income constraint represents a more prudent lending criterion than a loan-to-value constraint because income, unlike asset value, is less subject to distortions from bubble-like movements in asset prices. Figure 4 shows that during the U.S. housing boom of the mid-2000s, loan-to-value measures did not signal any signi…cant increase in household leverage because the value of housing assets rose together with household mortgage debt. Only after the collapse of house prices did the loan-to-value measures provide an indication of excessive household leverage. But by then, the over-accumulation of household debt had already occurred. 13 By contrast, the ratio of household mortgage debt to disposable personal income started to rise rapidly about …ve years earlier, providing regulators with an early warning signal of a potentially dangerous buildup of household leverage. Unfortunately, the signal was not heeded.
We show that the generalized borrowing constraint serves as an "automatic stabilizer"
by inducing an endogenously countercyclical loan-to-value ratio. In our view, it is much easier and more realistic for regulators to simply mandate a substantial emphasis on the borrowers'wage income in the lending decision rather than to expect regulators to frequently adjust the maximum loan-to-value ratio in a systematic way over the business cycle or the …nancial/credit cycle. 14 For the generalized borrowing constraint, we impose a weight of 50% on the borrower's wage income with the remaining 50% on the expected value of housing collateral. The multiplicative parameter in the borrowing constraint is adjusted to maintain the same steady-state loan-to value ratio as in the baseline model. Under hybrid expectations, the generalized borrowing constraint substantially reduces the volatility of household debt, while mildly reducing the volatility of other key variables, including output, labor hours, in ‡ation, and consumption. Notably, the policy avoids the large undesirable magni…cation of in ‡ation volatility that is observed in the two interest rate policy experiments.
Comparing across the various policy experiments, the generalized borrowing constraint appears to be the most e¤ective tool for dampening overall excess volatility in the model economy. The value of a typical central bank loss function declines monotonically (albeit slightly) as more weight is placed on the borrower's wage income in the borrowing constraint.
The bene…cial stabilization results of this policy become more dramatic if the loss function is expanded to take into account the variance of household debt. The expanded loss function can be interpreted as re ‡ecting a concern for …nancial stability. Speci…cally, the variance of household debt captures the idea that historical episodes of sustained rapid credit expansion have often led to crises and severe recessions. 15 Recently, the Committee on International Economic and Policy Reform (2011) has called for central banks to go beyond their traditional emphasis on ‡exible in ‡ation targeting and adopt an explicit goal of …nancial stability.
Similarly, Woodford (2011) argues for an expanded central bank loss function that re ‡ects a concern for …nancial stability. In his model, this concern is linked to a variable that measures …nancial sector leverage.
Related Literature
An important unsettled question in economics is whether policymakers should take deliberate steps to prevent or de ‡ate suspected asset price bubbles. 16 History tells us that bubbles can be Early contributions to the literature on monetary policy and asset prices (Bernanke and Gertler 2001, Cecchetti, al. 2002) employed models in which bubbles were wholly exogenous, i.e., bubbles randomly in ‡ate and contract regardless of any central bank action. Consequently, these models cannot not address the important questions of whether a central bank should take deliberate steps to prevent bubbles from forming or whether a central bank should try to de ‡ate a bubble once it has formed. In an e¤ort to address these shortcomings, Filardo (2008) develops a model where the central bank's interest rate policy can in ‡uence the transition probability of a stochastic bubble. He …nds that the optimal interest rate policy includes a response to asset price growth. Dupor (2005) considers the policy implications of non-fundamental asset price movements which are driven by exogenous "expectation shocks." He …nds that optimal monetary policy 1 5 Akram and Eitrheim (2008) investigate di¤erent ways of representing a concern for …nancial stability in a reduced-form econometric model. Among other metrics, they consider the standard deviation of the debt-toincome ratio and the standard deviation of the debt service-to-income ratio.
1 6 For an overview of the various arguments, see Lansing (2008) .
should lean against non-fundamental asset price movements. Gilchrist and Saito (2008) …nd that an interest-rate response to asset price growth is helpful in stabilizing an economy with rational learning about unobserved shifts in the economy's stochastic growth trend. Airaudo et al. (2012) …nd that an interest-rate response to stock prices can stabilize an economy against sunspot shocks in a rational expectations model with multiple equilibria. Our analysis di¤ers from these papers in that we allow a subset agents to depart from fully-rational expectations.
We …nd that the nature of agents'expectations can in ‡uence the bene…ts of an interest rate rule that responds to house price growth or credit growth.
Some recent research that incorporates moving-average forecast rules or adaptive expectations into otherwise standard models include Sargent (1999, Chapter 6), Evans and Ramey Constant-gain learning algorithms of the type described by Evans and Honkapoja (2001) are similar in many respects to adaptive expectations; both formulations assume that agents apply exponentially-declining weights to past data when constructing forecasts of future variables. 17 Orphanides and Williams (2005), Milani (2007) , and Eusepi and Preston (2011) all …nd that adaptive learning models are more successful than rational expectations models in capturing several quantitative properties of U.S. macroeconomic data. Adam, et al. (2012) show that the introduction of constant-gain learning in a small open economy can help account for recent cross-country patterns in house prices and current account dynamics. Granziera and Kozicki (2012) show that a simple Lucas-type asset pricing 
The Model
The basic structure of the model is similar to Iacoviello (2005) . The economy is populated by two types of households: patient (indexed by j = 1) and impatient (indexed by j = 2), of mass 1 n and n, respectively. Impatient households have a lower subjective discount factor ( 2 < 1 ) which generates an incentive for them to borrow. Nominal price stickiness is assumed in the consumption goods sector. Monetary policy follows a standard Taylor-type interest rate rule.
Households
Households derive utility from a ‡ow of consumption c j;t and services from housing h j;t : They derive disutility from labor L j;t . Each household maximizes
where the symbol b E j;t represents the subjective expectation of household type j, conditional on information available time t; as explained more fully below. Under rational expectations, b E j;t corresponds to the mathematical expectation operator E t evaluated using the objective distributions of the stochastic shocks, which are assumed known by the rational household. The parameter b governs the importance of habit formation in utility, where c j;t 1 is a reference level of consumption which the household takes into account when formulating its optimal consumption plan. The parameter j;h governs the utility from housing services, j;L governs the disutility of labor supply, and ' L governs the elasticity of labor supply. The total housing stock is …xed such that (1 n) h 1;t + nh 2;t = 1 for all t:
Impatient Borrowers. Impatient-borrower households maximize utility subject to the budget constraint:
where R t 1 is the gross nominal interest rate at the end of period t 1, t P t =P t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate during period t, w t is the real wage, q t is the real price of housing, and b 2;t 1 is the borrower's real debt at the end of period t 1:
New borrowing during period t is constrained in that impatient households may only borrow (principle and interest) up to a fraction of the expected value of their housing stock in period t + 1:
where 0 1 represents the loan-to-value ratio and b E 1;t q t+1 t+1 represents the lender's subjective forecast of future variables that govern the collateral value and the real interest rate burden of the loan.
The impatient household's optimal choices are characterized by the following …rst-order conditions:
where t is the Lagrange multiplier associated with the borrowing constraint. 19 Patient Lenders. Patient-lender households choose how much to consume, work, invest in housing, and invest in physical capital k t which is rented to …rms at the rate r k t : They also receive the …rm's pro…ts t and make one-period loans to borrowers. The budget constraint of the patient household is given by:
where (1 n) b 1;t 1 = nb 2;t 1 in equilibrium. In other words, the aggregate bonds of patient households correspond to the aggregate loans of impatient households.
The law of motion for physical capital is given by:
where is the depreciation rate and the function S (I t =I t 1 ) re ‡ects investment adjustment costs. In steady state S ( ) = S 0 ( ) = 0 and S 00 ( ) > 0:
The patient household's optimal choices are characterized by the following …rst-order conditions:
where the last two equations represent the optimal choices of k t and I t , respectively. The symbol q k
Firms and Price Setting
Firms are owned by the patient households. Hence, we assume that the subjective expectations of …rms are formulated in the same way as their owners.
Final Good Production. There is a unique …nal good y t that is produced using the following constant returns-to-scale technology:
where the inputs are a continuum of intermediate goods y t (i) and > 1 is the constant elasticity-of-substitution across goods. 
In the wholesale sector, there is a continuum of …rms indexed by i 2 [0; 1] and owned by patient households. Intermediate goods-producing …rms act in a monopolistic market and
labor, according to the following constant returns-to-scale technology:
where z t is an AR(1) productivity shock.
Intermediate Good Production. We assume that intermediate …rms adjust the price of their di¤erentiated goods following the Calvo (1983) model of staggered price setting. Prices are adjusted with probability 1 every period, leading to the following New Keynesian
Phillips curve:
where (1 )(1 )= and is the indexation parameter that governs the automatic price adjustment of non-optimizing …rms. Variables without time subscripts represent steadystate values. The variable mc t represents the marginal cost of production and u t is an AR (1) cost-push shock. Cost minimization implies the following expression for marginal cost
Monetary and Macroprudential Policy
In the baseline model, we assume that the central bank follows a simple Taylor-type rule of the form:
where R t is the gross nominal interest rate, r = 1= 1 1 is the steady-state real interest rate, t P t =P t 1 is the gross in ‡ation rate, y t =y is the proportional output gap, and & t is an AR(1) policy shock.
In the policy experiments, we consider the following generalized policy rule that allows for a direct response to either credit growth or house price growth:
where q t =q t 4 is the 4-quarter growth rate in house prices (which equals the growth rate in the market value of the …xed housing stock) and b 2;t =b 2;t 4 is the 4-quarter growth rate of household debt, i.e., credit growth.
In the aftermath of the global …nancial crisis, a wide variety of macroprudential policy tools have been proposed to help ensure …nancial stability. 20 For our purposes, we focus on policy variables that appear in the collateral constraint. For our …rst macroprudential policy experiment, we allow the regulator to adjust the value of the parameter in equation (3).
Lower values of imply tighter lending standards. In the second macroprudential policy experiment, we consider a generalized version of the borrowing constraint which takes the form
where m is the weight assigned by the lender to the borrower's wage income. Under this speci…cation, m = 0 corresponds to the baseline model where the lender only considers the expected value of the borrower's housing collateral. 21 We interpret changes in the value of m as being directed by the regulator. As m increases, the regulator directs the lender to place more emphasis on the borrower's wage income when making a lending decision. Whenever m > 0; we calibrate the value of the parameter b to maintain the same steady state loan-tovalue ratio as in the baseline version of the constraint (3). In steady state, we therefore have
where b = when m = 0: When m > 0; the equilibrium loan-to-value ratio is no longer constant but instead moves in the same direction as the ratio of the borrower's wage income to housing collateral value: Consequently, the equilibrium loan-tovalue ratio will endogenously decline whenever the market value of housing collateral increases faster than the borrower's wage income. In this way, the generalized borrowing constraint acts like an automatic stabilizer to dampen ‡uctuations in household debt that are linked to excessive movements in house prices.
Expectations
Rational expectations are built on strong assumptions about households'information. In actual forecasting applications, real-time di¢ culties in observing stochastic shocks, together with empirical instabilities in the underlying shock distributions could lead to large and persistent forecast errors. These ideas motivate consideration of a boundedly-rational forecasting algorithm, one that requires substantially less computational and informational resources. A long history in macroeconomics suggests the following adaptive (or error-correction) approach:
where X t+1 is the object to be forecasted and F t X t+1 is the corresponding forecast. In this model, X t+1 is typically a nonlinear combination of endogenous and exogenous variables dated at time t + 1. For example, in equation (5) we have X t+1 = U c 2;t+1 = t+1 ; whereas in equation (12) we have
The term X t F t 1 X t is the forecast error in period t: The parameter governs the response to the most recent observation X t . For simplicity, we assume that is the same for both types of households.
Equation (21) implies that the forecast at time t is an exponentially-weighted moving average of past observed values of the forecast object, where governs the distribution of weights assigned to past values-analogous to the gain parameter in the adaptive learning literature. When = 1; households employ a simple random walk forecast. By comparison, the "sticky-information" model of Mankiw and Reis (2002) implies that the forecast at time t is based on an exponentially-weighted moving average of past rational forecasts. A stickyinformation version of equation (21) could be written recursively as F t X t+1 = F t 1 X t + (E t X t+1 F t 1 X t ) ; where represents the fraction of households who update their forecast to the most-recent rational forecast E t X t+1 .
For each of the model's …rst order conditions, we nest the moving-average forecast rule (21) together with the rational expectation E t X t+1 to obtain the following "hybrid expectation" which is a weighted-average of the two forecasts
where ! can be interpreted as the fraction of households who employ the moving-average forecast rule (21). For simplicity, we assume that ! is the same for both types of households. In equilibrium, the fully-rational forecast E t X t+1 takes into account the in ‡uence of households who employ the moving-average forecast rule. Also for simplicity, we rule out asset trade between the fraction ! of households who employ the moving-average forecast rule and the fraction 1 ! who employ the rational forecast rule. Although the parameters ! and in ‡uence the volatility and persistence of the model variables, they do not a¤ect the deterministic steady state. 22
3 Model Calibration Table 1 1;L and 2;L ; together with the capital share of income parameter ; are set so that the top income decile in the model earns 40% of total income (including …rm pro…ts) in steady state, consistent with the long-run average income share measured by Piketty and Saez (2003) . 25 The elasticity parameter = 33:33 is set to yield a steady-state price mark-up of about 3%.
The discount factor of patient households is set to 1 = 0:99 such that the annualized steady-state real lending rate is 4%. The discount factor for impatient agents is set to 2 = 0:95; thus generating a strong desire for borrowing. The investment adjustment cost parameter = 5 is in line with values typically estimated in DSGE models. Capital depreciates at a typical quarterly rate of = 0:025. The habit formation parameter is b = 0:5. The labor supply elasticity parameter is set to ' L = 0:1; implying a very ‡exible labor supply. The housing weights in the utility functions are set to 1;h = 0:3 and 2;h = 0:1 for the patient and impatient households, respectively. Our calibration implies that the top income decile of households derive a relatively higher per unit utility from housing services. Together, these values imply a steady-state ratio of total housing wealth to annualized GDP of 1.98. According to Iacoviello (2010) , the corresponding ratio in U.S. data has ranged between 1.2 and 2. An extension of the model could allow the fraction ! to be time varying, depending on the recent performance of each forecasting rule, along the lines of Brock and Hommes (1998) . Alternatively, we could allow agents to adjust over time to improve forecasting performance over a moving window of recent data, along the lines of Lansing (2009 
Excess Volatility
In this section, we show that the hybrid expectations model generates excess volatility in asset prices and household debt while at the same time delivering co-movement between house prices, household debt, and real output. In this way, the model is better able to match the patterns observed in many industrial countries over the past decade.
Figure 6 depicts simulated time series for the house price, household debt, the price of capital q k t (which we interpret as a stock price index), aggregate real consumption, real output, 2 6 Levine, et al. (2012) employ a speci…cation for expectations that is very similar to our equations (21) and (22). However, their DSGE model omits house prices and household debt. They estimate the fraction of backward-looking agents (! in our model) in the range of 0.65 to 0.83 with a moving-average forecast parameter ( in our model) in the range of 0.1 to 0.4. 2 7 We thank Bill Emmons of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis for kindly providing this data, which are plotted in Figure 4 . aggregate labor hours, in ‡ation, and the policy interest rate R t . All series are plotted as percent deviations from steady state values without applying any …lter. The …gure shows that the hybrid expectations model serves to magnify the volatility of most model variables. This is not surprising given that the moving-average forecast rule (21) embeds a unit root assumption. This is most obvious when = 1 but is also true when 0 < < 1 because the weights on lagged variables sum to unity. Due to the self-referential nature of the equilibrium conditions, the households'subjective forecast in ‡uences the dynamics of the object that is being forecasted. 28 The use of moving-average forecast rules by a subset of agents also in ‡uences the nature of the fully-rational forecast rules employed by the remaining agents. Both of these channels serve to magnify volatility. Table 2 compares volatilities under rational expectations (! = 0) to those under hybrid expectations where a fraction ! = 0:30 of agents employ moving-average forecast rules: Excess volatility is greatest for the household debt series which is magni…ed by a factor 2.07. The volatility of house prices is magni…ed by a factor of 1.77. House price volatility is magni…ed by less than debt volatility because the patient-lender households in the model do not use debt for the purchase of housing services. The volatility of labor hours is magni…ed by a factor of 1.92 whereas output volatility is magni…ed by a factor of 1.36. Stock price volatility is magni…ed by a factor of 1.30. The volatilities of the other variables are also magni…ed, but in a less dramatic way. Consumption volatility is magni…ed by a factor 1.12. Another salient feature of the recent U.S. data, reproduced by the hybrid expectations model, is the co-movement of GDP, house prices, and household debt. Our simulations mimic the evidence that in a period of economic expansion, a house price boom is accompanied by an increase in household debt, as the collateral constraint allows both to move up simultaneously. Table 3 shows that the persistence of most model variables is higher under hybrid expectations. The autocorrelation coe¢ cient for house prices goes from 0.90 under rational expectations to 0.97 under hybrid expectations. The autocorrelation coe¢ cient for household debt goes from 0.79 to 0.94. The increased persistence improves the model's ability to produce large swings in house prices and household debt, as was observed in many industrial countries 2 8 A simple example with = 1 illustrates the point. Suppose that the Phillips curve is given by t = b Et t+1 + yt; where yt follows an AR(1) process with persistence and b Et t+1 = !Ft t+1 + (1 !) Et t+1: When Ft t+1 = t; the equilibrium law of motion is t = yt= [1
When < 1; both V ar ( t) and V ar (Et t+1) are increasing in the fraction of agents ! who employ a random walk forecast. over the past decade.
Figures 7 through 9 plot impulse response functions. In the case of all three shocks, the resulting ‡uctuations in the hybrid expectations model tend to be more pronounced and longer lasting than those in the rational expectations model. The overreaction of house prices and stock prices to fundamental shocks in the hybrid expectations model is consistent with historical interpretations of bubbles. As noted by Greenspan (2002) , "Bubbles are often precipitated by perceptions of real improvements in the productivity and underlying pro…tability of the corporate economy. But as history attests, investors then too often exaggerate the extent of the improvement in economic fundamentals."
As noted in the introduction, countries with the largest increases in household leverage tended to experience the fastest run-ups in house prices from 1997 to 2007. The same countries tended to experience the most severe declines in consumption once house prices started falling.
The hybrid expectations model delivers the result that excess volatility in house prices and household debt also gives rise to excess volatility in consumption.
Central bank loss functions are often modeled as a weighted-sum of squared deviations of in ‡ation and output from targets. In our model, such a loss function is equivalent to a weighted-sum of the unconditional variances of in ‡ation and output since the target (or steady-state) values of both variables equal zero. The results shown in Table 2 imply a higher loss function realization under hybrid expectations. As discussed further in the next section, a concern for …nancial stability might be re ‡ected in an expanded loss function that takes into account the variance of household debt. In this case, the high volatility of household debt observed under hybrid expectations would imply a higher loss function realization and hence a stronger motive for central bank stabilization policy.
Policy Experiments
In this section, we evaluate various policy actions that might be used to dampen excess volatility in the model economy. We …rst examine the merits of a direct response to either house price growth or household debt growth in the central bank's interest rate rule. Next, we analyze the use of two macroprudential policy tools that a¤ect the borrowing constraint, i.e., a permanent reduction in the loan-to-value ratio and a policy that directs lenders to place increased emphasis on the borrower's wage income in determining how much they can borrow.
Interest Rate Response to House Price Growth or Credit Growth
The generalized interest rate rule (19) allows for a direct response to either house price growth credit growth. As an illustrative case, Table 3 shows the results when the central bank responds to the selected …nancial variable with a coe¢ cient of q = 0:2 or b = 0:2:
The top panel of Table 4 shows that under rational expectations, responding to house prices does not yield any stabilization bene…ts for output. The volatility of labor hours is actually magni…ed by a factor of 1.29 relative to the no-response version of the same model. The standard deviation of in ‡ation is somewhat magni…ed with a volatility ratio of 1.06. These results are in line with Iacoviello (2005) who …nds little or no stabilization bene…ts for an interest rate response to the level of house prices in a rational expectations model. The largest stabilization e¤ect under rational expectations is achieved with household debt which exhibits a volatility ratio 0.77. Consumption volatility is reduced with a ratio 0.95. Under hybrid expectations, responding to house price growth yields qualitatively similar results. However, the undesirable magni…cation of in ‡ation volatility is now quantitatively much larger-exhibiting a volatility ratio of 1.21. The policy under hybrid expectations delivers some stabilization bene…ts for household debt (volatility ratio of 0.93), but consumption volatility is little changed (volatility ratio of 0.99) and labor hours volatility is magni…ed (volatility ratio of 1.15).
The bottom panel of Table 4 shows the results for an interest rate response to credit growth.
Under rational expectations, the results are broadly similar to an interest rate response to house price growth. However, under hybrid expectations, responding to credit growth now performs poorly. Speci…cally, in ‡ation volatility is magni…ed by a factor of 1.83 and there is no compensating reduction in the volatility of household debt. On the contrary, debt volatility is slightly magni…ed by a factor of 1.03. The volatility of labor hours is magni…ed by a factor of 1.06. These results demonstrate that the stabilization bene…ts of a particular monetary policy can be in ‡uenced by the nature of agents'expectations. Under rational expectations, the impatient households understand that an increase in borrowing will contribute to higher interest rates which in turn, will raise the cost of borrowing. This expectations channel serves to dampen ‡uctuations in household debt. But under hybrid expectations, this channel becomes less e¤ective because a subset of borrowers construct forecasts using a moving-average of past values.
Figures 10 and 11 plot the results for hybrid expectations when we allow q or b to vary from a low 0 to a high of 0.4. As either q or b increase, the policy ends up magnifying the volatility of output, labor hours, and in ‡ation, with the undesirable e¤ect on in ‡ation being more severe when responding to credit growth. In the lower right panel of the …gure, we plot the realized values of two illustrative loss functions that are intended to represent plausible stabilization goals of a central bank. Loss function 1 is a commonly-used speci…cation consisting of an equal-weighted sum of the unconditional variances of in ‡ation and output. Loss function 2 includes an additional term not present in loss function 1, namely, the unconditional variance of household debt which is assigned a relative weight of 0.25. We interpret the additional term as re ‡ecting the central bank's concern for …nancial stability. Here, we link the concern for …nancial stability to a variable that measures household leverage whereas Woodford (2011) links this concern to a variable that measures …nancial sector leverage.
Figures 10 and 11 show that responding to either house price growth or credit growth is detrimental from the standpoint of loss function 1. However, in light of the severe economic fallout from the recent …nancial crisis, views regarding the central bank's role in ensuring …nancial stability appear to be shifting. From the standpoint of loss function 2, an interest rate response to house price growth achieves some success in reducing the loss, provided that the response coe¢ cient q is not too large. In contrast, an interest rate response to credit growth remains detrimental under loss function 2 because the policy does not stabilize ‡uctuations in household debt.
As a caveat to the above results, we acknowledge that the parameters of the generalized interest rate rule (19) have not been optimized to minimize the value of any utility function or loss function. The thought experiment we have in mind involves a modest shift from exisiting central bank policy (which we interpret as being captured by equation (18)) to an interest policy that responds to a …nancial variable that previously had been ignored. If such a policy shift were to be actually undertaken by a real-world central bank, one would not expect policymakers to radically alter their responses to in ‡ation and output at the same time. While an exploration of optimal monetary policy is beyond the scope of this paper, such an exploration might identify some additional stabilization bene…ts to responding to either house price growth or credit growth. The fully-optimal monetary policy would respond to all state variables in the model. In the case of hybrid expectations, the lagged expectation of backward-looking agents (i.e., the lagged moving average of the forecast variable) would represent an additional state variable that would appear in the central bank's optimal policy rule.
Tightening of Lending Standards: Decrease LTV
The top panel of Table 5 shows the results for a macroprudential policy that permanently tightens lending standards by reducing the maximum loan-to-value ratio in equation (3) from 0.7 to 0.5. Under both rational and hybrid expectations, the policy succeeds in reducing the volatility of household debt, but the volatility of most other variables, including output, labor hours, and in ‡ation are slightly magni…ed. Figure 12 plots the results for hybrid expectations when we allow to vary from a low 0.2 to a high of 1.0. The …gure shows that higher values of (implying looser lending standards) reduce the volatility of output, labor hours, in ‡ation, and consumption over a middle range of loan-to-value ratios. However, as approaches 1.0, the volatilities of in ‡ation and consumption start increasing again.
The volatility patterns shown in Figure 12 illustrate a complicated policy trade-o¤. On the one hand, a tightening of lending standards can stabilize household debt and thereby help promote …nancial stability. But on the other hand, permanently restricting access to borrowed money will impair the ability of impatient households to smooth their consumption, thus magnifying the volatility of aggregate consumption (as well as output, labor hours, and in ‡ation).
In the lower right panel of Figure 12 , we see that a decrease in starting from 0.7 is detrimental from the standpoint of loss function 1 which only considers output and in ‡ation.
However, the same policy is bene…cial from the standpoint of loss function 2 which takes into account …nancial stability via ‡uctuations in household debt. Under these circumstances, a decision by regulators to tighten lending standards could be met with opposition from those who do not share the regulator's concern for …nancial stability.
Wage Income in the Borrowing Constraint
A basic problem with loan-to-value constraints is that the denominator (i.e., value) is subject to bubble-induced distortions. During the U.S. housing boom of the mid-2000s, standard loanto-value ratios provided no signi…cant warning of an excessive run-up in household leverage because debt and housing values rose together in a self-reinforcing feedback loop. Later, however, after housing values collapsed, a painful deleveraging was forced upon households which continues to impose a signi…cant drag on consumer spending and real economic growth more than 3 years after the o¢ cial end date of the recession. Figure 13 compares the volatility of the borrower's wage income to the volatility of the borrower's housing value in the model under rational expectations versus the model under hybrid expectations. When expectations are fully-rational, the volatilties of the two series are roughly similar, so it does not make much di¤erence which one is included in the collateral constraint. However, when expectations are not fully-rational, the volatility of the borrower's housing value is much larger than the volatility of the borrower's wage income. In this case, excess volatility in housing value is transmitted directly to excess volatility in household debt, which is harmful from a …nancial stability perspective. In a world where asset prices exhibit excess volatility, all agents could potentially bene…t if lending decisions were made on the basis of the borrower's wage income, which is less subject to bubble-induced distortions than housing value.
The bottom panel of Table 5 shows the results for a macroprudential policy that requires lenders to place a substantial emphasis on the borrower's wage income in the borrowing constraint. Speci…cally, we set m = 0:5 in equation (20) with b = 1:072 so as to leave the steady-state loan-to-value ratio unchanged from the baseline model with m = 0:
Under both expectations regimes, the policy succeeds in reducing the volatility of household debt. Under rational expectations, the volatility of household debt is reduced by a factor of 0.86. Under hybrid expectations, debt volatility is reduced by a factor 0.68. The volatility e¤ects on the other variables are generally quite small, but for the most part, volatilities are reduced under hybrid expectations. Figure 14 plots the results for hybrid expectations when we allow m to vary from a low of zero (representing a pure loan-to-value constraint) to a high of 1.0 (representing a pure loanto-income constraint). As m increases, the policy achieves small reductions in the volatilities of output, labor hours, in ‡ation, and consumption. Notably, the policy avoids the undesirable magni…cation of in ‡ation volatility that was observed in the two interest rate policy experiments. In this sense, the present policy can be viewed as superior simply because it avoids doing harm. In the lower right panel of the …gure, we see that an increase in m achieves small stabilization bene…ts from the standpoint of loss function 1, but much larger bene…ts from the standpoint of loss function 2. Figure 15 shows that the generalized borrowing constraint with m = 0:5 induces endogenous countercyclicality of the loan-to-value ratio. In this way, the policy serves as an "automatic stabilizer"for household debt. The intuition for this result is straightforward. Dividing both side of equation (20) by
where the left-side variable is the equilibrium loan-to-value ratio plotted in Figure As mentioned in the introduction, a number of recent papers have explored the stabilization bene…ts of countercyclical loan-to-value rules in rational expectations models. While it may be possible to successfully implement such state-contingent rules within a regulatory framework, it seems much easier and more transparent for regulators to simply mandate a substantial emphasis on the borrower's wage income in the lending decision. A cross-country empirical study by Lim, et al. (2011) compares the use and performance of loan-to-value constraints versus debt-to-income constraints together with other macroprudential policy tools. Their regression results (p. 53) show that the implementation of a debt-to-income cap is more e¤ective than a loan-to-value cap in reducing the growth rates of real estate prices and credit.
Conclusion
There are many examples in history of asset prices exhibiting sustained run-ups that are di¢ cult to justify on the basis of economic fundamentals. The typical transitory nature of these run-ups should perhaps be viewed as a long-run victory for fundamental asset pricing theory. Still, it remains a challenge for fundamental theory to explain the ever-present volatility of asset prices within a framework of e¢ cient markets and fully-rational agents.
This paper showed that the introduction of a subset of agents who employ simple movingaverage forecast rules can signi…cantly magnify the volatility and persistence of house prices and household debt versus an otherwise similar model with fully-rational agents. A wide variety of empirical evidence supports the idea that expectations are often less than fully-rational.
One obvious example can be found in survey-based measures of U.S. in ‡ation expectations which are well-captured by a moving average of past in ‡ation rates. A moving-average forecast rule can also be justi…ed as an approximation to a standard Kalman …lter algorithm in which the forecast variable is subject to both permanent and temporary shocks. Sensitivity to interest rate response to house price growth -Hybrid expectations Figure 10 : A stronger interest-rate response to house price growth helps to stabilize household debt but it magni…es the volatility of output, labor hours, and particularly in ‡ation. The …gure plots ratios relative to the hybrid expectations model with q = 0: Loss function 1 = V ar ( t ) + V ar (y t ) : Loss function 2 = V ar ( t ) + V ar (y t ) + 0:25 V ar (b 2;t ). 
Sensitivity to LTV ratio -Hybrid expectations
Figure 12: A tightening of lending standards in the form of a reduction in the loan-to-value ratio helps to stabilize household debt but it magni…es the volatility of consumption, output, labor hours, and in ‡ation. The …gure plots ratios relative to the baseline hybrid expectations model with = 0:7: Loss function 1 = V ar ( t ) + V ar (y t ) : Loss function 2 = V ar ( t ) + V ar (y t ) + 0:25 V ar (b 2;t ). Figure 13 : When expectations are fully-rational, the volatilties of the borrower's wage income and housing value are roughly similar, so it does not make much di¤erence which one is included in the collateral constraint. However, when expectations are not fully-rational, the volatility of the borrower's housing value greatly exceeds the volatility of the borrower's wage income. In this case, excess volatility in housing value is transmitted directly to excess volatility in household debt, which is harmful from a …nancial stability perspective. 
